Abstract
Introduction
Suppose that you have a set of documents for which you want to create signatures. Though the documents may only differ in a few positions, with an ordinary signature scheme you usually have to sign each document from scratch. The idea of incremental signature schemes as introduced by Bellare, Goldreich and Goldwasser in [2, 31 is that you sign one document M and quickly create the signatures for the other documents Then an incremental scheme supporting the replace modification allows to produce a signature for M' much faster from M , S, c and i than it would take to compute a signature from scratch.
The construction of incremental schemes introduces a new kind of attack, so-called substitution attacks. Performing such an attack the adversary is allowed to alter the document before update steps. For example, given a document/signature pair ( M , S ) the adversary may tamper M to M* and then call the incremental algorithm to replace a block. As we want the incremental algorithm to be fast it cannot access the whole document M (resp. M * ) but rather read, say, poly(1ogn) blocks. Due to this time restriction, the incremental algorithm cannot check the validity of the document/signature pair. Hence, it signs a document different from what it considers to sign.
It has turned out that substitution attacks constitute a very powerful form of attack. Until now, there have only been two construction which are secure against substitution attacks. One construction, IncXMACC, is based on the XOR MACs [4] and can be found in [9] . For documents of n blocks this scheme produces message authentication codes (MACs) of bit length 0 (nlogs), where s denotes the security parameter. It has the additional property that the incremental algorithm merely accesses the corresponding block for each replacement. We call such schemes single block accessing schemes. The other approach is the tree scheme [3] and its variation [15] . This scheme produceslsignatures resp. MACs of length 0 (ns). The tree scheme remains secure against total substitution attacks, where the adversary may tamper the signature as well as the document before update steps. Beside replacement , both approaches support additional text modifications like single block insertion and deletion.
Our results
For single block accessing schemes which are secure against substitution attacks and support the replace modification, we show that for all n there exists a document of n blocks such that the incremental scheme produces a signature of size R (n) with positive probability. Thus IncXMACC is optimal up to a factor 0 (logs). In fact, a quantitative analysis shows that there are R(2"/4) documents of n blocks such that the incremental scheme creates R (n)-bit signatures with constant probability for each of these documents. For schemes reading several blocks in every update step, we show a lower bound of R(n1/(2+")) for any constant c > 0, yet leaving a large gap in comparison to the tree scheme. In this case, the number of documents with n blocks that cause large signatures with probability R ( l l l o g n ) is at least R(2"1"2+c'/4). If the incremental algorithm only reads a constant number of blocks then our technique yields the stronger bound R (fi)
for the signature size.
For instance, our result shows that we cannot design incremental hash-and-sign schemes that withstand substitution attacks and produce short signatures. An incremental hash-and-sign scheme consists of an incremental hash function and an ordinary signature scheme. The signature for document M is a pair Sh) , where h M is the hash value of M and sh is a signature for h. To update this signature, update the hash value fast by the incremental property and sign the new hash value with the ordinary scheme. We remark that our bounds even hold in the random oracle model [5] where signer and adversary share a public random hash function (see discussion in section 3.2). Finally, we prove a new lower bound for noninvasive off-line checkers. See section 5.
The lower bounds for the signature size follow by reduction to Yao's randomized two-party communication model [20] . Namely, two processors A and B , each one getting a secret input x resp. y E (O,l},, want to compute f,(x,y) for a boolean function f, :
(0,1}2n + (0,1} by communicating as few bits as possible. It is well known that R (n) bits are necessary for some functions, even if we allow a small error probability. More concretely, througout this paper we'll use the disjointness function disj, which is 0 if and only if there exists an i such that the ith bits in x and y are both 1. In other words, if we view x,y as the characteristic vectors of two sets, each of n elements, then disj,(x,y) = l iff the sets are disjoint. The lower bound R ( n ) for disj, has been shown by Kalyanasundaram and Schnitger [12] . Their proof has been simplified by Razborov [18] .
In a nutshell, our construction can be outlined as follows. Processor A signs an appropriate document M, containing x E (0, l}, with the incremental scheme and sends this signature to B. Depending on his input y processor B does several incremental signature generations (performing a substitution attack). Then B sends the final signature to A who verifies that this signature is valid for M,. With high probability this holds if and only if x and y are disjoint. Thus, we compute the disj, function with small error probability. Let m be the number of blocks in M z , e.g. we'll use m = n + 1 and m = n2+=. As the communication complexity of disj, is R ( n ) we conclude that one of the exchanged signatures must have R (n) bits in the worst case. Substituting the document length m by n yields the lower bound R (n) resp. R ( , I / ( ' + ' ) ) .
Related work
In [9] we show a lower bound for substitution detecting schemes, where the incremental algorithm verifies in each update step whether relevant parts of the document have been tampered or not. These schemes produce signatures of R (n/I(n)) bits, where I ( n ) denotes the maximum number of accessed blocks for each replacement. This bound has been transfered from the memory checker model of Blum et al. [6] . For these special schemes, the bound in [9] is tighter than our result, while our bounds are applicable to incremental schemes in general.
Chor, Gerkb-Graus and Kushilevitz [7] have already applied lower bounds in communication complexity to obtain impossibility results for so-called private protocols. They show that some functions over the integers cannot be computed privately. Otherwise we could design an efficient protocol for the identity function contradicting lower bounds for the communication complexity of this problem. See [l, 
Preliminaries
For two strings z,y E {0,1}* we write z . y or zy for the concatenation of x and y. Denote by xm the m-fold concatenation of x and let xi E ( 0 , l ) be the ith bit in 2.
Incremental schemes
We give all definitions and results for digital signature schemes only. We remark that the lower bounds hold for message authentication schemes, too. Documents M E {0,1}* are divided into blocks M = M [ l ] . 'It's crucial for our result that the document space contains every polynomial bit string from C* (though C = ( 0 , l )
resp. b = 1 suffices). Otherwise we cannot apply the lower bound for the disjointness problem.
The completeness condition says that signatures which have been produced by Sig from scratch resp. IncSig from a valid document/signature pair must be valid. This requirement can be relaxed by allowing a small error probability. Note that S can be stateful, i.e., store information about previous signatures and documents. Our lower bounds hold if this information takes only a few bits, say 0 (logs), or if the state information can be determined by the number of signature generations (e.g., if S holds a counter). We'll elaborate this when discussing the protocols. We remark that all known incremental schemes merely use a counter as state information. We omit the keys d , e from the inputs for Sig, IncSig Our protocols can be easily adapted to work with single block deletion. On the other hand, replace is probably the most simple modification one can think of. This has been confirmed by the design of all incremental algorithms so far. For instance, if a scheme supports single block insertion and deletion then it also supports replacement. Simply delete the corresponding block and insert the new value.
We want IncSig to be fast. Therefore we assume that this algorithm accesses only a few document blocks for each update step. To be concrete, IncSig can only read I ( n ) blocks from the stored document M [ l ] . 
An adversary is a family C = ( C s ) s E~ of polynomial size circuits performing an adaptive chosen message attack [lo] . That is, for s E N the scheme S is initiated by a pair of keys ( d , e) produced by KGen(1"). Then adversary C, queries oracles Sig and IncSig for documents and parameters of his choice, where the ith query depends on e, the coin tosses and the previous i -1 signatures and documents. During the attack, the adversary may tamper the last stored document M by an alter(M*) command. That is, he replaces M by M* regardless of the current content of M . However, the signature S and the state information of S remain unchanged. This form of attack is called a message substitution attack.2 'This terminology is taken from [9] . To avoid confusion, in this paper we call strings to be signed documents, while messages are strings being exchanged in the communication model.
We introduce virtual documents [3] to define successful attacks. According to [lo] , an ordinary signature scheme is broken if the adversary produces a signature for a "fresh" document, i.e., a document that hasn't been signed previously. Considering incremental schemes and substitution attacks, it is not obvious what a "fresh document is. For instance, if the adversary tampers document M to M * before calling IncSig then it's not clear which document is supposed to not be viewed as "fresh" anymore. The notion of virtual documents enables us to associate each signature to a document content and, therefore, to designate "fresh documents. Informally, virtual documents are documents which S considers to have signed in an attack. More formally, if Sig creates a signature for a document M then the corre-
. If the adversary issues an alter(M*) command for M then we set virt(M*) = virt(M). An adversary is successful if he produces a signature for a document which hasn't appeared as a virtual document before. See [3] for discussions about virtual documents.
A replace-incremental signature scheme is called Esecure against message substitution attacks for E : N -+ R, if for all adversaries C the probability that C, performs a successful message substitution attack is at most E ( S ) for all s E N. For the rest of this paper, we assume that S is a complete, €-secure, replaceincremental scheme with E ( S ) < $ for a constant c < 1 and all sufficient large s (so that e(s) is bounded away from f by a constant factor). Note that signature schemes, incremental and ordinary ones, usually achieve the better security level E ( S ) < 1/ poly (s) for all sufficient large s (under some standard cryptographic assumption).
Communication complexity
The communication model consists of two processors A and B , where A gets input z E (O,l}" and B gets y E (0, l}n. They want to compute the value fn(z,y) of a boolean function f n : (0,1}2n -+ (0,1} with low communication cost, i.e., by exchanging as few bits as possible. Both processors share a public random tape and are computationally unbounded. Though in this work, they always run in polynomial time. A protocol P defines the messages that are exchanged. The ith message depends on the first i -1 messages, the coin tosses and the corresponding input of the processor. Let A give the output bit. DeThus, we would better say "document substitution attacks" note by P ( x , y) E (0,1} the random variable describing the output distribution of the protocol for inputs z,y. Here, the probability is taken over the public coin tosses.
Define err(fn, P) = max{Prob [ P ( z ,
y)]} to be the error probability of P , where the maximum is taken over all inputs x , y E (0, 1)". Let C(P,z, y) be the maximum number of bits communicated by protocol P for inputs z,y, where the maximum is taken over all random strings. Then C(P) = max{C(P,z, y) 12, y E (0, l}n}. For 0 5 6 < f define the bounded error communication complexity for fn by R:"b(fn) = min(C(P) I P with err(fn,P) 5 6 ) We have Rrb(disj,) = R ( n ) for all constants 6 with 0 5 6 < 4 by [12, IS]. The superscript "pub" indicates that the communication complexity is defined in the public coin model (as opposed to the private coin model [14] ).
Lower bound for single block accessing schemes
In this section we show a lower bound for replaceincremental signature schemes where IncSig merely reads the jth block for a replace(., a , j ) command. We assume that n = n(s) = poly (s) is a fixed function of the security parameter s. Then we can identify the function disj, for parameter n and the adversary C, for security parameter s.
The key observation for the protocol is that disj,(x,y) = 1 if and only if xj = 0 for all j E {1,2,. . . , n } with yj = 1. Party A signs x and sends the signature to B.3 For all positions j with y j = 1 party B calls IncSig to replace the jth bit by 0 producing a sequence of at most n signatures. In each update step, B guesses that the original bit xj was 0. That is, B first substitutes z by 0". Since IncSig only reads the corresponding block for each update step, substituting z by 0" in fact means to exactly alter those bits xj with y j = 1 to 0. Then B generates the incremental signatures as described above and finally sends the last signature to A , who outputs 1 if and only if this signature is valid for z.
If disj,(z, y) = 0, or equivalent if xJ = 1 for some j with y j = 1, then B has altered the corresponding bit. As S is secure against these attacks the signature won't be valid for z with high probability, i.e., P(z,y) = 0. On the other hand, if disj,(z, y) = 1 3T0 be precise, A signs I. 0. We omit the technical nuisances in this informal, introductory description.
resp. x j = 0 for all j with y j = 1, then BS guesses have been correct and since S is complete, we have
Protocol
Wlog. we suppose that the block size b is one. Otherwise pad each bit with b -1 zeros. We augment x and y by a bit '0' to obtain documents X = x . O and Y = y . 0, each of n + 1 blocks resp. bits. We use this extra bit to show that intersecting inputs yield a successful attack on the incremental scheme for a document which hasn't appeared as a virtual document.
A and B seperately run KGen(1") with their common random tape to generate the same pair (d,e) of &bit keys. Then A signs X with Sig to obtain a signature SA. A sends this signature to B. Now B works as follows. Let J = { j E (1,. . . , n } I y j = 1). For notational convenience, we assume that J is arbitrarily ordered and that Ji denotes the ith element in J . A and B share the same signature scheme S. This construction works, for example, if the state information of S is predictable by the number of signature generation, i.e., the state information consists of a counter. Then we can assume wlog. that B always makes n f l update steps (e.g., by repeating replace(2, 0, J1) modifications). Therefore, A and B know the state of S when receiving a signature. Alternatively, we can communicate the state information with each signature. In this case, our lower bounds remain valid up to a constant factor as long as the bit length of the state information is o ( n ) . For example, S could recycle random bits. In this case the coin tosses are part of the state information. All algorithms of S are polynomial time. Hence, the number of random bits that have been used in A's or B's phase can be written down with 0 (logn) bits. Communicating this number with each message suffices because A and B share a common random string. We remark that the state information usually is part of the signature because we cannot expect the verifier to know the previous signature generations. Hence, if it is too large then we will have long signatures anyway.
In our protocol, we call IncSig to replace a bit '0' by '0' again. It is reasonable to assume that IncSig refuses to produce a new signature in this case. Fortunately, we can easily fix this by first replacing the bit '0' by '1' and then resetting the bit to '0' again. Hence, for the analysis we presume that the incremental algorithm supports this kind of replacement.
Analysis
small error probabilty.
We show that the protocol computes disj, with Proof. Since disj,(x,y) = 1 we have X j = Zj = 0 for all j E J by equation (1). Thus, running IncSig for replace(Z,O, Jh+l) is equivalent to running IncSig for document X = replace(X, 0, J h + l ) for all h. Here we exploit the fact that IncSig merely reads the corresponding block for update steps. Because Xn+l = Zn+' = 0, this holds also for the last step where B replaces the augmented bit '0' by '1'. As S is complete 0 we obtain Vf(x .1, S B ) = P ( x , y) = 1. Proof. Let C = (Cs)sE~ be a family of polynomial size circuits. Then C, gets as non-uniform polynomial advice z, y with disj,(x,y) = 0 such that x, y maximize the probability that P ( z , y ) = 1. Circuit C, simulates the protocol using its oracle access to Sig and IncSig (after these algorithms have been initiated with a random pair of keys). Obviously, this can be done in polynomial size.
We show that C, produces a valid forgery with the single Vf query given that P(x, y) = 1. From equation and W = replace(W(IJI), 1, n + l ) . The latter one is the only virtual document having '1' at position n + l . But Wi = 0 for all i E J and therefore Wj = 0 # 1 = X j = xj. Thus, z e 1 hasn't appeared as a virtual document.
By assumption, P(x,y) = Vf(z . 1,Sg) = 1. Hence, this is a successful message.substitution attack on S 0 which happens with probability at most E(s).
Observe that our construction works in the random oracle model [5], too. In this case, we have a public random hash function which we can simulate using the public random tape. Note that substituting the document length n + 1 by n doesn't change the asymptotic bound.
Proof.
for large s. We know that Rrb(disj,) = R (n). Assume towards contradiction that the signature length of all documents with n + 1 blocks is less than $Rrb(disj,) (minus the size for the state information). Then protocol P communicates less than Rrb(disj,) bits. By lemma 3.1 and 3.2, the protocol computes disj, with error probability at most ~( s ) < 6 and we derive a contradiction.
So far we've only proved that (the valid) signature S A for X or signature SB has R (n) bits. However, SB might not be valid. But we can conclude that there must be x, y such that SA has at least R ( n ) bits or disj,(x, y ) = 1 and therefore Sg is a valid signature with R(n) bits. If this were not the case, then for all constants c the following would hold for infinitely many n: For all x, y E ( 0 , l ) " with disj,(z, y ) = 1 we would communicate less than cn bits. Thus, we could design a protocol that stops after having exchanged at most cn bits, because then A and B would already know that disj,(z, y) = 0. This would be a contradic-0 Theorem 3.3 only states that the incremental scheme produces signatures with R ( n ) bits with positive probability f o r one document. However, we remark that for all known schemes the signature size does not depend on the specific document nor the random bits (up to a constant factor, see [15] for an example where the size varies). Anyhow, the quantitative analysis in section 3.4 shows that there are R (2n/4) documents for which the incremental scheme produces large signatures with constant probability.
From non-uniform to uniform adversaries
We have defined security of signature schemes in terms of non-uniform adversaries. This enables us to "wire" an appropriate pair (2, y ) E (0, 1}2n into circuit C,. Razborov [18] has proved the lower bound for RFUb(disj,) by presenting a distribution p on (0, 1}2n Let 6 be a constant with ~( s ) < 6 < tion to the lower bound for disj,.
for which the distributional complexity (see [14]) is R (n). For simplicity let n = 4L -1. Then x, y are generated as follows:
0 Choose a random partition (Tz,{z},Ty) of (1,. . . , n } such that ITzI = lTyl = 2L -1.
Let x and y be random sets of size L drawn from T, U (z} and Ty U {i}, respectively.
Clearly, we can sample z, y in polynomial time (in n).
Observe that each of the inputs 2 and y has L 5 [n/41
bits '1,. If n ( s ) is efficiently computable by a Turing machine on input lS, then we can replace circuit family (C,),,N by an uniform adversary. Note that the error probability of our protocol is still E ( s ) . However, it is not straightforward that the communication complexity remains Cl (n), because the probability space now consists of the distribution of the random tape and the input. But the lower bound for the distributional complexity holds in this case as well (see [14]). Hence, even incremental signature schemes which are 6c~nlyi7 secure against uniform adversaries produce large signatures.
3.4
In this section we analyze the number of documents that cause large signature and the probability for it. The quantitative theorem 3.4 below remains valid in the uniform setting.
Quantitative version of theorem 3.3
Theorem 3.4 For every n there are R (PI4) documents of n blocks such that for each of these documents, Sig or IncSig produces a valid signature with bit size R (n) with constant non-zero probability.
In particular, the average signature size for these documents is R (n). The proof of theorem 3.4 is omitted. We investigate the ratio of documents with large signatures. Party A signs a document X with L blocks 
To motivate our construction we explain why we cannot apply the idea from the previous section directly. There, B assumed that all x j with y j = 1 must be 0. Otherwise we have x j = y j = 1 and an error occurs (unless we break the incremental scheme). Here, IncSig might read additional blocks to update the signature. The major problem is that B would have to guess all the values IncSig reads. More precisely, assume that B wants to replace block j with y j = 1 by 0. Let yh be another block that IncSig would read for this update step and suppose that Yh = 0. Then B has to guess Zh. If he's wrong (e.g., if X h = 0 but B tries 1) then the final signature SB won't be valid with high probability though the inputs might yet be disjoint. Note that bits Yh = 1 don't cause problems. For these bits, B tries Xh = 0 which will be correct if x , y are disjoint and leads to the desired message substitution otherwise. This example shows that the "dangerous" bits are those with yi = 0. For these bits, B will guess by default that the corresponding bit xi is 1. Hence we'll only be wrong for blocks with x; = y; = 0.
We sketch the underlying idea of our solution. We stretch x, y by an expansion factor E(n) = by appending l ( n ) -n blocks '0'. Denote these extended documents by X and Y . Using their common coin tosses A and B agree on a random permutation n over (1,. . . ,!(n)}. Let n ( X ) and n(Y) denote the documents obtained by applying rr to X resp. Y. See figure   1 . Note that disj,(x, y) = disj, ( (.(X), 7r(Y) ). Then we adapt the protocol of the previous section for n ( X ) and n(Y). Namely, A signs n ( X ) and sends the signature SA t o B. Party B iteratively calls the incremental algorithm to replace all blocks in n ( X ) such that a bit yi = 1 has been mapped to the corresponding position 
. , [ ( T I ) } . We write T ( X )
A signs n ( X ) with Sig and sends the signature SA to B. Again, let J = { j I yj = 1) and Ji be the ith element in J (for some fixed order). Denote
Then 2 equals n ( X ) on bits n(n+ l), . . . , n(!(n)) and is set to 1 -yz for 7r-l (i) E {I,. . . , n}. Party B alters
algorithm B runs IncSig on replace(Z,O, T ( J h + l ) ) and signature S(h) to obtain S(h+l). We have again 2 = repIace(Z,O,n(Jh+l)) for all h. Finally, let SB be the signature produced by IncSig for replace(2, 1, n(n+ 1)) and S(IJI). Receiving signature S B , party A runs Vf for X' and SB where X' = replace(n(X), 1, n(n + 1)) and outputs 1 iff Vf accepts.
Analysis
Assume that A and B have agreed on a permutation n. Let H = { h~ {1, . . . , n } ( z h = l } and J = { j E (1,. . . , n } I y j = l}. Note that H n J = 0 if and only if x , y are disjoint. We say that a block i in n ( X ) is forbidden with respect to (z,y,rr) iff Zi. In this case, whether running IncSig for 2 or n ( X ) is equivalent or not, only depends on the values x j for j E J . We can therefore apply the idea of the previous section.
We start by showing that the execution is good with high probability. We abbreviate E(n) by E and I(!(n)) by I . The proof of the following lemma is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 4.1 The probability that a n execution is good is at least exp ( -6 ) f o r all suficient large n.
By equation (2) we have exp ( -A) > f for a constant c > 1 and all sufficient large n, i.e., the probability is bounded away from $ by a constant factor. Proof. Suppose that the execution is good. This happens with the claimed probability. First observe that party B only replaces blocks ~( j ) in ,(Y) with y j = 1 and we have z j = 0 for all such j by assumption disj,(z,y) = 1. Additionally, other blocks that IncSig reads equal the corresponding values in Z because the execution is good. Now the claim follows as in lemma 3.1. The quantitative version can be derived as before. Though, we were only able to show a lower bound of R ( l l l o g n ) for the probability that Sig or IncSig produces a large signature. Theorem 4.5 Let l(n) = poly(n) be an invertible function satisfying equation (2) . Then f o r every n there are R(2e-1(n)/4) documents of n blocks such that f o r each of these documents, Sig or IncSig produces a valid signature with bit size R (e-l (n)) with probability R(I/logn).
In this case, the number of documents with large signatures is R(2.25e-'(n)) compared to the total number of 0 (2.*lZn) documents. With the same technique as in section 3.3 we can replace circuit family C by an uniform adversary if n ( s ) and [(n) are polynomialtime computable. The proof of theorem 4.5 is omitted. In Appendix B we sketch how to improve the bounds for schemes where IncSig has a very simple access strategy.
Lower bounds for memory checkers
Consider the data structure RAM (random access memory) with readable and writeable bit cells. If we store values via RAM on an insecure memory they could be tampered by an adversary causing read operations to give wrong answers. A memory checker provides a method to detect such errors. Instead of giving our operations to RAM directly we pass it to the checker who cares about storage and retrieval. To verify the correctness of the output of RAM the checker can keep information in his private memory which the adversary cannot read or tamper. A checker is called invasive if it stores additional information on the insecure memory. Otherwise it is called noninvasive. An on-line checker gives a warning immediately when an error occurs, while off-line checkers may output "error" at a later point of the execution. More formal definitions are given in [6] and [9] .
Blum et al. [6] give lower bounds for the size of the checker's private memory for RAM,, i.e., random access memory with n cells. Namely, they show that (invasive and therefore noninvasive) off-line checkers must have R (logn) bits private memory. For noninvasive on-line checkers they prove the lower bound
where I ( n ) denotes the maximum number of cells which the checker reads for each operation. This bound can be easily transfered to substitution detecting incremental signature schemes [9] . To best of our knowledge there haven't been proved any lower bounds for noninvasive off-line checker so far (except for the bound R (logn) for invasive checkers).
We briefly describe how to apply our technique to the memory checker model. We'll deal with the general case of arbitrary access strategies. Our improvements for special access methods of incremental signature schemes hold in the checker scenario as well. Additionally, our quantitative theorems can be easily adapted. Assume that we are given a noninvasive off-line checker for RAM. Processor A runs the memory checker writing n ( X ) into memory. Let M A E {O,l}mA denote the checker's private memory after this sequence of operations. Then A sends M A and the number T A of random bits used by the checker with mA + 0 (logrA) bits to B. Note that the checker's state is totally determined by M and the coin tosses. Party B continues the checker's simulation by reading all values ~( j ) with y j = 1. B uses the same string 2 as in section 4 to predict the values that the checker reads. Finally, B sends the content M B E (0,l)"B of the checker's private memory and the number rg of random bits to A (and a bit indicating whether the checker has already given an error message or not). Processor A passes "finished" to the checker that may give a few more operations to RAM in a postprocessing phase. A simulates these additional operations using M B and T ( X ) . It outputs that x, y are disjoint if and only if the checker hasn't returned a warning. The same analysis as in section 4 shows that the error probability of this protocol is sufficiently small. Hence the memory size of the checker can be R (!-'(TI) -logr(n)) where r ( n ) denotes the number of random bits used by the checker. Clearly, this bound holds for on-line checkers, too, but it is inferior to the one given in [6] . 
A Proof of lemma 4.1
Consider the following randomized game between IncSig and our permutation generating algorithm. In this game, IncSig tries to find a forbidden block while the generator picks a random permutation to hide these blocks in 7 r ( X ) . Observe that after the ith update step IncSig hasn't obtain more information about the random permutation than it gets from the state information about 7r(X) sent by A (including the signature for 7r(X)), the blocks that it has yet read from 7r(X) and the query positions 7r(J1), . . . ,n-(J%). In support of the signature scheme we will assume that IncSig is given n ( X ) and n(J) in advance. Note that we even handicap the generator by this. We say that IncSig is successful if it reads a forbid- 
=O}\?r(J).
We have ILI 2 l ( n ) -IN1 -IJI (with equality iff z,y are disjoint). The forbidden blocks are uniformly distributed among L. Moreover, IncSig's view (including 7r(X) and 7 r ( J ) ) gives no advantage in predicting their posititions. We conclude that the probability that IncSig doesn't access a forbidden block is distributcd hypergeometric [B] . Namely, we have a population of at least [(n) -IN1 -IJI = n E -I N 1 -IJI elements of which at most n arc red (i.e. forbidden bits) and at least n E -n are black (padded bits or blocks with 2% = 1 or yl = 1). Then IncSig randomly draws a set of (at most) n I elements from the p~p u l a t i o n .~ It accesses a forbidden block if and only if it picks a red element.
IncSig reads at most nI bits from n ( X ) . Let the random variable R denote the number of red elements when R is distributed according to the description above. Then the probability that IncSig doesn't access a forbidden block in the whole execution is given by the probability for R = 0: 
Expanding the documents if IncSig

